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I1JLL TEXT OF OPINIONS 
No 92-833 
KFVTN ALBRIGHT, PETITIONER v. ROGER 
OLIVER, ETC , FT AJ 
ON WHIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT 
OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
Syllabus 
No 92-833 Argued October 12,1993—Decided January 24,1994 
Upon learning that Illinois authorities had issued an arrest warrant 
charging him with the Bale of a substance which looked like an 
illegal drug, petitioner Albright surrendered to respondent Oliver, 
a policeman, and was released after posting bond. At a prelimi-
nary hearing, Oliver testified that Albright told the look-alike 
substance to a third party, and the court found probable cause to 
bind Albright over for trial. However, the court later dismissed 
the action on the ground that the charge did not state an offense 
under state law. Albright then filed this suit under 42 U. S. C. 
§1983, alleging that Oliver deprived him of substantive due pro-
cess under the Fourteenth Amendment—his "liberty interest"—to 
be free from criminal prosecution except upon probable cause. The 
District Court dismissed on the ground that the complaint did not 
state a claim under §1983. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding 
that prosecution without probable cause is a constitutional tort 
actionable under §1983 only if accompanied by incarceration, loss 
of employment, or some other "palpable consequenc[e]." 
Held: The judgment is affirmed. 
975 F. 2d 343, affirmed. 
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, joined by JUSTICE O'CONNOR, JUSTICE 
SCALIA, and JUSTICE GINSBURG, concluded that Albright's claimed 
right to be free from prosecution without probable cause must be 
judged under the Fourth Amendment, and that substantive due 
process, with its "scarce and open-ended" "guideposts for responsi-
ble decisionmaking," Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S. , , 
can afford Albright no relief. Where a particular Amendment 
"provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection" 
against a particular sort of government behavior, "that Amend-
ment, not the more generalized notion of 'substantive due process/ 
must be the guide for analyzing" such a claim. Graham v. Con-
nor, 490 U. S. 386, 395. The Fourth Amendment addresses the 
matter of pretrial deprivations of liberty, and the Court has noted 
that Amendment's relevance to the liberty deprivations that go 
hand in hand with criminal prosecutions. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 
420 U. S. 103, 114. The Court has said that the accused is not 
"entitled to judicial oversight or review of the decision to prose-
cute." Id., at 118-119. But Albright was not merely charged; he 
submitted himself to arrest. No view is expressed as to whether 
his claim would succeed under the Fourth Amendment, since he 
has not presented the question in his certiorari petition. 
JUSTICE KENNEDY, joined by JUSTICE THOMAS, determined that 
Albright's due process claim concerns not his arrest but instead 
the malicious initiation of a baseless criminal prosecution against 
him. The due process requirements for criminal proceedings do 
not include a standard for the initiation of a prosecution. More-
over, even assuming, arguendo, that the common-law interest in 
freedom from malicious prosecution is protected by the Due Pro-
cess Clause, there is neither need nor legitimacy in invoking 42 
U. S. C. §1983 in this case, given the fact that Illinois provides a 
tort remedy for malicious prosecution and the Court's holding in 
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527, 535-544, that a state actor's 
random and unauthorized deprivation of such a due process inter-
est cannot be challenged under §1983 so long as the State provides 
an adequate post-deprivation remedy. 
NOTICE: These opinions are subject to formal revision before publi-
cation in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are 
requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the 
United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other 
formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the prelimi-
nary print goes to press. 
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JUSTICE SOUTER concluded that, because this case presents no 
substantial burden on liberty beyond what the Fourth Amendment 
is generally thought to redress already, petitioner has not justified 
recognition of a substantive due process violation in his prosecu-
tion without probable cause. Substantive due process should be 
reserved for otherwise homeless substantial claims, and should not 
be relied on when doing so will duplicate protection that a more 
specific constitutional provision already bestows. Petitioner's 
asserted injuries—including restraints on his movement, damage 
to his reputation, and mental anguish—are not alleged to have 
flowed from the formal instrument of prosecution, as distinct from 
the ensuing police seizure of his person; have been treated by the 
Courts of Appeals as within the ambit of compensability under 42 
U. S. C. §1983 for Fourth Amendment violations; and usually 
occur only after an arrest or other seizure 
REHNQUIST, C. J., announced the judgment of the Court and 
delivered an opinion, in which O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and GINSBURG, 
JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., and GINSBURG, J., filed concurring opinions 
KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which 
THOMAS, J., joined. SOUTER, J., filed an opinion concurring in the 
judgment. STEVENS, J , filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACK-
MUN, J., joined. 
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST announced the judgment of 
the Court and delivered an opinion, in which JUSTICE 
O'CONNOR, JUSTICE SCALIA, and JUSTICE GINSBURG 
joined 
A warrant was issued for petitioner's arrest by Illinois 
authorities, and upon learning of it he surrendered and 
was released on bail. The prosecution was later dis-
missed on the ground that the charge did not state an 
offense under Illinois law. Petitioner asks us to recog-
nize a substantive right under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from criminal 
prosecution except upon probable cause. We decline to 
do so. 
This case comes to us from a decision of the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirming the grant of a 
motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(bX6), and we must therefore 
accept the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as 
true. Illinois authorities issued an arrest warrant for 
petitioner Kevin Albright, charging him on the basis of 
a previously filed criminal information with the sale of 
a substance which looked like an illegal drug. When he 
learned of the outstanding warrant, petitioner surren-
dered to respondent, Roger Oliver, a police detective 
employed by the city of Macomb, but denied his guilt of 
such an offense. He was released after posting bond, 
one of the conditions of which was that he not leave the 
State without permission of the court.1 
1
 Before the criminal information was filed, one Veda Moore, mi 
undercover informant, had told Oliver that the bought cocaine from 
one John Albright, Jr., at a student hotel in Macomb. The "cocaine* 
turned out to be baking powder, however, and the grand jury 
indicted John Albright, Jr., for telling a look-alike" substance. 
When Detective Oliver went to serve the arrest warrant, he discov-
ered that John Albright, Jr., was a retired pharmacist in his sixties, 
nd apparently realised he was on a false scent. After discovering 
hat it could not have been the elderly Albright's son, John David, 
who was involved in the incident, Detective Oliver contacted Moore 
to see if the sale was actually made to petitioner Kevin Albnght, a 
second son of John Albright, Jr. Moore confirmed that petitioner 
Kevin Albright made the sale. 
NOTE: Where it is deemed desirable, a syllabus (beadnote) will be 
released • • • at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes 
no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the 
Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United 
States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337. 
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At a preliminary hearing, respondent Oliver testified 
that petitioner sold the look-alike substance to Moore, 
and the court found probable cause to bind petitioner 
over for trial. At a later pretrial hearing, the court 
dismissed the criminal action against petitioner on the 
ground that the charge did not state an offense under 
Illinois law. 
Albright then instituted this action under Rev. Stat. 
§ 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, against Detective Oliver in 
his individual and official capacity, alleging that Oliver 
deprived him of substantive due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment—his liberty interest"—to be free 
from criminal prosecution except upon probable cause.2 
The District Court granted respondent's motion to 
dismiss under Rule 12(bX6) on the ground that the 
complaint did not state a claim under §1983.* The 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, 975 
F. 2d 343 (1992), relying on our decision in Paul v. 
Davis, 424 U. S. 693 (1976). The Court of Appeals held 
that prosecution without probable cause is a constitu-
tional tort actionable under § 1983 only if accompanied 
by incarceration or loss of employment or some other 
"palpable consequence]." 975 F. 2d, at 346-347. The 
panel of the Seventh Circuit reasoned that "just as in 
the garden-variety public-officer defamation case that 
does not result in exclusion from an occupation, state 
tort remedies should be adequate and the heavy weap-
onry of constitutional litigation can be left at rest." Id., 
at 347.4 We granted certiorari, 507 U. S. (1993), 
'The complaint also named the City of Macomb as a defendant to 
the § 1983 action, and charged a common-law mahcious prosecution 
claim against Detective Oliver. 
'The District Court also held that Detective Oliver was entitled to 
a defense of qualified immunity, and that the complaint failed to 
allege facts sufficient to support municipal liability against the city 
of Macomb. The District Court also dismissed without prejudice the 
common-law claim of malicious prosecution against Detective Oliver. 
These issues are not before this Court. 
4
 As noted by the Court of Appeals below, the extent to which a 
claim of malicious prosecution is actionable under § 1983 is one "on 
which there is an embarrassing diversity of judicial opinion." 975 
F. 2d, at 345, citing Brummett v. Camble, 946 F. 2d 1178, 1180, 
n. 2 (CA5 1991) (cataloging divergence of approaches by the Courts 
of Appeals). Most of the lower courts recognize some form of mali-
cious prosecution action under § 1983. The disagreement among the 
courts concerns whether malicious prosecutions, standing alone, can 
violate the Constitution. The most expansive approach is exempli-
fied by the Third Circuit, which holds that the elements of a mali-
cious prosecution action under § 1983 are the same as the common-
law tort of mahcious prosecution. See, e. g., Lee v. Mihalich, 847 F. 
2d 66, 70 (CA3 1988) (*[T]he elements of liability for the constitu-
tional tort of malicious prosecution under § 1983 coincide with those 
of the common law tort"). See also, Sanders v. English, 950 F. 2d 
1152, 1159 (CA5 1992) (10]ur circuit recognizes causes of action 
under § 1983 for false arrest, illegal detention . . . and malicious 
prosecution" because these causes of action "implicate the constitu-
tional 'guarantees of the fourth and fourteenth amendments'. . ."); 
Robinson v. Aforu/jS, 895 F. 2d 649 (CA10 1990); Strength v. Hubert, 
854 F. 2d 421, 426, and n. 5 (CAll 1988) (recognizing that "freedom 
from mahcious prosecution is a federal right protected by § 1983"). 
Other Circuits, however, require a showing of some injury or depri-
vation of a constitutional magnitude in addition to the traditional 
elements of common-law malicious prosecution. The exact standards 
announced by the courts escape easy classification. See, e. g.t 
Torres v. Superintendent of Police of Puerto Rico, 893 F. 2d 404, 409 
(CA1 1990) (the challenged conduct must be "so egregious that it 
violated substantive or procedural due process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment"); Usher v. Los Angeles, 828 F. 2d 556, 
561-562 (CA9 1987) ("[T]he general rule is that a claim of malicious 
prosecution is not cognizable under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 if process is 
available within the state judicial system to provide a remedy . . . 
and while we affirm the judgment below, we do so on 
different grounds. We hold that it is the Fourth 
Amendment, and not substantive due process, under 
which petitioner Albright's claims must be judged. 
Section 1983 "is not itself a source of substantive 
rights," but merely provides "a method for vindicating 
federal rights elsewhere conferred.* Baker v. McCollan, 
443 U. S. 137, 144, n. 3 (1979). The first step in any 
such claim is to identify the specific constitutional right 
allegedly infringed. Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 
394 (1989); and Baker v. McCollan, supra, at 140. 
Petitioner's claim before this Court is a very limited 
one. He claims that the action of respondents infringed 
his substantive due process right to be free of prosecu-
tion without probable cause. He does not claim that 
Illinois denied him the procedural due process guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor does he claim 
a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, notwith-
standing the fact that his surrender to the State's show 
of authority constituted a seizure for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 19 
(1968); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U. S. 593, 596 
(1989).5 
We begin analysis of petitioner's claim by repeating 
our observation in Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S. 
, (1992) (slip op., at 9). "As a general matter, 
the Court has always been reluctant to expand the 
concept of substantive due process because the guide-
posts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered 
area are scarce and open-ended." The protections of 
substantive due process have for the most part been 
accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procre-
ation, and the right to bodily integrity. See, e. g., 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U. S. , (1992) (slip op., at 5-6) (describing cases 
in which substantive due process rights have been recog-
nized). Petitioner's claim to be free from prosecution 
except on the basis of probable cause is markedly 
different from those recognized in this group of cases. 
Petitioner relies on our observations in cases such as 
United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 746 (1987), and 
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327, 331 (1986), that the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
confers both substantive and procedural rights. This is 
undoubtedly true, but it sheds little light on the scope 
of substantive due process. Petitioner points in particu-
lar to language from Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 
516, 527 (1884), later quoted in Daniels, supra, stating 
that the words "by the law of the land" from the Magna 
Carta were "'intended to secure the individual from the 
[hjowever, 'an exception exists to the general rule when a malicious 
prosecution is conducted with the intent to deprive a person of equal 
protection of the laws or is otherwise intended to subject a person 
to a denial of constitutional rights'*); Coogan v. Wixom, 820 F. 2d 
170, 175 (CA6 1987) (in addition to elements of malicious prosecu-
tion under state law, plaintiff must show an egregious misuse of a 
legal proceeding resulting in a constitutional deprivation). In 
holding that malicious prosecution is not actionable under § 1983 
unless it is accompanied by incarceration, loss of protected status, or 
soma other palpable consequence, the Seventh Circuit's decision 
below places it in this latter camp. In view of our disposition of 
this case, it is evident that substantive due process may not furnish 
the constitutional peg on which to hang such a "tort" 
•Thus, Albright may have missed the statute of limitations for any 
claim he had based on an unconstitutional arrest or seizure. 975 
F. 2d 343, 345 (CA7 1992). We express no opinion as to the timeli-
ness of any such claim he might have. 
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arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.'" This, 
too, may be freely conceded, but it does not follow that, 
in all of the various aspects of a criminal prosecution, 
the only inquiry mandated by the Constitution is 
whether, in the view of the Court, the governmental 
action in question was "arbitrary." 
Hurt ado held that the Due Process Clause did not 
make applicable to the States the Fifth Amendment's 
requirement that all prosecutions for an infamous crime 
be instituted by the indictment of a grand jury. In the 
more than 100 years which have elapsed since Hurtado 
was decided, the Court has concluded that a number of 
the procedural protections contained in the Bill of Rights 
were made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), 
overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), and 
holding the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule 
applicable to the States; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 
(1964), overruling Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 
(1908), and holding the Fifth Amendment's privilege 
against self-incrimination applicable to the States; 
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969), overruling 
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937), and holding 
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
applicable to the States; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U. S. 335 (1963), overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 
455 (1942), and holding that the Sixth Amendment's 
right to counsel was applicable to the States. See also 
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U. S. 213 (1967) (Sixth 
Amendment speedy trial right applicable to the States); 
Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14 (1967) (Sixth Amend-
ment right to compulsory process applicable to the 
States); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968) 
(Sixth Amendment right to jury trial applicable to the 
States). 
This course of decision has substituted, in these areas 
of criminal procedure, the specific guarantees of the 
various provisions of the Bill of Rights embodied in the 
first 10 Amendments to the Constitution for the more 
generalized language contained in the earlier cases 
construing the Fourteenth Amendment. It was through 
these provisions of the Bill of Rights that their Framers 
sought to restrict the exercise of arbitrary authority by 
the Government in particular situations. Where a 
particular amendment "provides an explicit textual 
source of constitutional protection" against a particular 
sort of government behavior, "that Amendment, not the 
more generalized notion of 'substantive due process,' 
must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Graham 
v. Connor, 490 U. S., at 395.6 
'Justice STEVENS' dissent faults us for ignoring, inter alia, our 
decision in In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970). Winship undoubt-
edly rejected the notion that all of the required incidents of a 
fundamentally fair trial were to be found in the provisions of the 
Bill of Rights, but it did so as a matter of procedural due process: 
'This notion [that the government must prove the elements of a 
criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt]—basic in our law and 
rightly one of the boasts of a free society—is a requirement and a 
safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural content 
of "due process."'" Id% at 362, quoting Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 
790, 802-803 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
Similarly, other cases relied on by the dissent, including Mooney 
v. Holokan, 294 U. S. 103 (1935), Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264 
(1959), Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963), Giglio v. United 
States, 405 U. S. 150 (1972), and United States v. Agurs, All U. S. 
97 (1976), were accurately described in the latter opinion as "dealing 
with the defendant's right to a fair trial mandated by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution." Id, 
at 107. 
We think this principle is likewise applicable here. 
The Framers considered the matter of pretrial depriva-
tions of liberty, and drafted the Fourth Amendment to 
address it. The Fourth Amendment provides: 
"The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized." 
We have in the past noted the Fourth Amendment's 
relevance to the deprivations of liberty that go hand in 
hand with criminal prosecutions. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 
420 U. S. 103, 114 (1975) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable 
cause as a prerequisite to any extended restraint on 
liberty following an arrest). We have said that the 
accused is not "entitled to judicial oversight or review of 
the decision to prosecute." Id., at 118-119. See also 
Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 541, 545 (1962); hem 
Woon v. Oregon, 229 U. S. 586 (1913). But here 
petitioner was not merely charged; he submitted himself 
to arrest. 
We express no view as to whether petitioner's claim 
would succeed under the Fourth Amendment, since he 
has not presented that question in his petition for 
certiorari. We do hold that substantive due process, 
with its "scarce and open-ended" "guideposts," Collins v. 
Harker Heights, 503 U. S., at (slip op., at 9), can 
afford him no relief.7 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore 
Affirmed. 
JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring. 
One can conceive of many abuses of the trial process 
(for example, the use of a patently biased judge, see 
Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U. S. 455, 465-466 
(1971)), that might cause a criminal sentence to be a 
deprivation of life, liberty or property without due 
process. But here there was no criminal sentence (the 
indictment was dismissed), and so the only deprivation 
of life, liberty or property, if any, consisted of 
petitioner's pretrial arrest. I think it unlikely that the 
procedures constitutionally "due," with regard to an 
arrest, consist of anything more than what the Fourth 
Amendment specifies; but petitioner has in any case not 
invoked "procedural" due process. 
Except insofar as our decisions have included within 
the Fourteenth Amendment certain explicit substantive 
protections of the Bill of Rights—an extension I accept 
because it is both long established and narrowly lim-
ited—I reject the proposition that the Due Process 
Clause guarantees certain (unspecified) liberties, rather 
than merely guarantees certain procedures as a prereq-
uisite to deprivation of liberty. See TXO Production 
Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U. S. , -
(1993) (SCALIA, J., concurring). As I have acknowledged, 
Petitioner appears to have argued in the Court of Appeals some 
variant of a violation of his constitutional right to interstate travel 
because of the condition imposed upon him pursuant to his release 
on bond. But he has not presented any such question in his peti-
tion for certiorari, and has not briefed the issue here. We therefore 
do not consider it. 
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however, see Michael H. v. Gerald D.t 491 U. S. 110, 
121 (1989) (opinion of SCALIA, J.), this Court's current 
jurisprudence is otherwise. But that jurisprudence 
rejects "the more generalized notion of 'substantive due 
process'" at least to this extent: it cannot be used to 
impose additional requirements upon such of the states' 
criminal processes as are already addressed (and left 
without such requirements) by the Bill of Rights. 
Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 395 (1989). That 
proscription applies here. The Bill of Rights sets forth, 
in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, procedural guaran-
tees relating to the period before and during trial, 
including a guarantee (the Grand Jury Clause) regarding 
the manner of indictment. Those requirements are not 
to be supplemented through the device of "substantive 
due process." 
For these reasons, in addition to those set forth by the 
CHIEF JUSTICE, the judgment here should be affirmed. 
JUSTICE GINSBURG, concurring. 
I agree with the plurality that Albright's claim against 
the police officer responsible for his arrest is properly 
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment rather than 
under the heading of substantive due process. See ante, 
at 4. I therefore join the plurality opinion and write 
separately to indicate more particularly my reasons for 
viewing this case through a Fourth Amendment lens. 
Albright's factual allegations convey that Detective 
Oliver notoriously disobeyed the injunction against 
unreasonable seizures imposed on police officers by the 
Fourth Amendment, and Albright appropriately invoked 
that Amendment as a basis for his claim. See App. to 
Pet. for Cert. A-37, A-53. Albright's submission to 
arrest unquestionably constituted a seizure for purposes 
of the Fourth Amendment. See ante, at 5. And, as the 
Court of Appeals recognized, if the facts were as Al-
bright alleged, then Oliver lacked cause to suspect, let 
alone apprehend him. 975 F. 2d 343, 345 (CA7 1992); 
see post, at 2-3 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). 
Yet in his presentations before this Court, Albright 
deliberately subordinated invocation of the Fourth 
Amendment and pressed, instead, a substantive due 
process right to be free from prosecution without 
probable cause.1 This strategic decision appears to have 
been predicated on two doubtful assumptions, the first 
relating to the compass of the Fourth Amendment, the 
second, to the time frame for commencing this civil 
action. 
Albright may have feared that courts would narrowly 
define the Fourth Amendment's key term "seizure" so as 
to deny full scope to his claim. In particular, he might 
have anticipated a holding that the "seizure" of his 
person ended when he was released from custody on 
bond, and a corresponding conclusion that Oliver's 
'Albright's presentations essentially carve up the officer's conduct, 
though all part of a single scheme, so that the actions complained of 
match common law tort categories: first, false arrest (Fourth Amend-
ment's domain); next, malicious prosecution (Fifth Amendment territory). 
In my view, the constitutional tort 42 U. S. C. {1983 authorizes stands 
on its own, influenced by the substance, but not tied to the formal 
categories and procedures, of the common law. According the Fourth 
Amendment full sway, I would not force Albright's case into a different 
mold. 
allegedly misleading testimony at the preliminary 
hearing escaped Fourth Amendment interdiction.2 
The Fourth Amendment's instruction to police officers 
seems to me more purposive and embracing. This Court 
has noted that the common law may aid contemporary 
inquiry into the meaning of the Amendment's term 
"seizure." See California v. Hodari D., 499 U. S. 621, 
626, n. 2 (1991). At common law, an arrested person's 
seizure was deemed to continue even after release from 
official custody. See, e.g., 2 M. Hale, Pleas of the 
Crown *124 ("he that is bailed, is in supposition of law 
still in custody, and the parties that take him to bail 
are in law his keepers"); 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 
*297 (bail in both civil and criminal cases is "a delivery 
or bailment, of a person to his sureties, . . . he being 
supposed to continue in their friendly custody, instead 
of going to gaol"). The purpose of an arrest at common 
law, in both criminal and civil cases, was "only to 
compel an appearance in court," and "that purpose is 
equally answered, whether the sheriff detains [the 
suspect's] person, or takes sufficient security for his 
appearance, called bail." 3 id., at *290 (civil cases); 4 
id., at *297 (nature of bail is the same in criminal and 
civil cases). The common law thus seems to have 
regarded the difference between pretrial incarceration 
and other ways to secure a defendant's court attendance 
as a distinction between methods of retaining control 
over a defendant's person, not one between seizure and 
its opposite.3 
This view of the definition and duration of a seizure 
comports with common sense and common understand* 
ing. A person facing serious criminal charges is hardly 
freed from the state's control upon his release from a 
police officer's physical grip. He is required to appear 
in court at the state's command. He is often subject, as 
in this case, to the condition that he seek formal permis-
sion from the court (at significant expense) before 
exercising what would otherwise be his unquestioned 
right to travel outside the jurisdiction. Pending prosecu-
tion, his employment prospects may be diminished 
severely, he may suffer reputational harm, and he will 
experience the financial and emotional strain of prepar-
ing a defense. 
A defendant incarcerated until trial no doubt suffers 
greater burdens. That difference, however, should not 
lead to the conclusion that a defendant released pretrial 
is not still "seized" in the constitutionally relevant sense. 
Such a defendant is scarcely at liberty; he remains 
apprehended, arrested in his movements, indeed "seized" 
for trial, so long as he is bound to appear in court and 
answer the state's charges. He is equally bound to 
appear, and is hence "seized" for trial, when the state 
employs the less strong-arm means of a summons in lieu 
of arrest to secure his presence in court.4 
8
 Such a concern might have stemmed from Seventh Circuit precedent 
set before Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989). See Wilkins v. May, 
872 F. 2d 190, 192-195 (1989) (substantive due process "shock the 
conscience" standard, not Fourth Amendment, applies to brutal "post-
arrest pre-charge" interrogation). 
3For other purposes, e. g., to determine the proper place for condemna-
tion trials, "seizure" traditionally had a time- and site-specific meaning. 
See Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457,471 (1874) ("seizure [of a sloop] 
is a single act"; "[possession, which follows seizure, is continuous"). 
4
 On the summons-and-complaint alternative to custodial arrest, 
see 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 432-436 (2d ed. 1987). 
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This conception of a seizure and its course recognizes 
that the vitality of the Fourth Amendment depends upon 
its constant observance by police officers. For Oliver, 
the Fourth Amendment governed both the manner of, 
and the cause for arresting Albright. If Oliver gave 
misleading testimony at the preliminary hearing, that 
testimony served to maintain and reinforce the unlawful 
haling of Albright into court, and so perpetuated the 
Fourth Amendment violation.5 
A second reason for Albright's decision not to pursue 
a Fourth Amendment claim concerns the statute of 
limitations. The Court of Appeals suggested in dictum 
that any Fourth Amendment claim Albright might have 
had accrued on the date of his arrest, and that the 
applicable two-year limitations period expired before the 
complaint was filed.6 975 F. 2d, at 345. Albright 
expressed his acquiescence in this view at oral argu-
ment. Tr. of Oral Arg. 13, 20-21. 
Once it is recognized, however, that Albright remained 
effectively "seized" for trial so long as the prosecution 
against him remained pending, and that Oliver's testi-
mony at the preliminary hearing, if deliberately mislead-
ing, violated the Fourth Amendment by perpetuating the 
seizure, then the limitations period should have a 
different trigger. The time to file the §1983 action 
should begin to run not at the start, but at the end of 
the episode in suit, i.e., upon dismissal of the criminal 
charges against Albright. See McCune v. Grand Rapids, 
842 F. 2d 903, 908 (CA6 1988) (Guy, J., concurring in 
result) ("Where . . . innocence is what makes the state 
action wrongful, it makes little sense to require a 
federal suit to be filed until innocence or its equivalent 
is established by the termination of the state procedures 
in a manner favorable to the state criminal defendant."). 
In sum, Albright's Fourth Amendment claim, asserted 
within the requisite period after dismissal of the crim-
inal action, in my judgment was neither substantively 
deficient nor inevitably time-barred. It was, however, a 
claim Albright abandoned in the District Court and did 
not attempt to reassert in this Court. The principle of 
party presentation cautions decisionmakers against 
asserting it for him. See ante, at 8. 
* * * 
'Albright's reliance on a "malicious prosecution* theory, rather than 
a Fourth Amendment theory, is anomalous. The principal player in 
carrying out a prosecution—in "the formal commencement of a criminal 
proceeding," see post, at 5 (STEVENS, J., dissenting)—is not police officer 
but prosecutor. Prosecutors, however, have absolute immunity for their 
conduct See Burns v. Reed, 500 U. S. , - (1991) (slip op., at 
7-12). Under Albright's substantive due process theory, the star player 
is exonerated, but the supporting actor is not. 
In fact, Albright's theory might succeed in exonerating the supporting 
actor as well. By focusing on the police officer's role in initiating and 
pursuing a criminal prosecution, rather than his role in effectuating and 
maintaining a seizure, Albright's theory raises serious questions about 
whether the police officer would be entitled to share the prosecutor's 
absolute immunity. See post, at 19, n. 26 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the issue is open); ef. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U. S. 325, 326 
(1933) (holding that § 1983 does not "authoriz[e] a convicted person to 
assert a claim for damages against a police officer for giving perjured 
testimony at his criminal trial"). A right to sue someone who is 
absolutely immune from suit would hardly be a right worth pursuing. 
*In $ 1983 actions, federal courts apply the state statute of limita-
tions governing actions for personal injury. See Wilson v. Garcia, 
471 U. S. 261, 276-280 (1985). The question when the limitations 
period begins to run, however, is one of federal law. See id., at 
268-271; see generally Connors v. Hallmark 6 Son Coal Co., 935 F. 
2d 336, 341 (CADC 1991) (collecting cases). 
In Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989), this Court 
refused to analyze under a "substantive due process" 
heading an individual's right to be free from police 
applications of excessive force. "Because the Fourth 
Amendment provides an explicit textual source of 
constitutional protection against this sort of . . . govern-
mental conduct," we said, "that Amendment, not the 
more generalized notion of 'substantive due process/ 
must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Id., at 
395. I conclude that the Fourth Amendment similarly 
proscribes the police misconduct Albright alleges. I 
therefore resist in this case the plea "to break new 
ground," see Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S. , 
(1992) (slip op., at 9), in a field—substantive due 
process—that "has at times been a treacherous [one] for 
this Court." See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 
494, 502 (1977) (opinion of Powell, J.). 
JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, 
concurring in the judgment. 
I agree with the plurality that an allegation of arrest 
without probable cause must be analyzed under the 
Fourth Amendment without reference to more general 
considerations of due process. But I write because Al-
bright's due process claim concerns not his arrest but in-
stead the malicious initiation of a baseless criminal pros-
ecution against him. 
I 
The State must, of course, comply with the constitu-
tional requirements of due process before it convicts and 
sentences a person who has violated state law. The ini-
tial question here is whether the due process require-
ments for criminal proceedings include a standard for 
the initiation of a prosecution. 
The specific provisions of the Bill of Rights neither im-
pose a standard for the initiation of a prosecution, see 
Amdts. 5, 6, nor require a pretrial hearing to weigh evi-
dence according to a given standard, see Gerstein v. 
Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 119 (1975) ("[A] judicial hearing is 
not prerequisite to prosecution"); Costello v. United 
States, 350 U. S. 359, 363 (1956) ("An indictment re-
turned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, 
like an information drawn by the prosecutor, . . . is 
enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits. The 
Fifth Amendment requires nothing more"). Instead, the 
Bill of Rights requires a grand jury indictment and a 
speedy trial where a petit jury can determine whether 
the charges are true. Amdts. 5, 6. 
lb be sure, we have held that a criminal rule or 
procedure that does not contravene one of the more 
specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights may nonetheless 
violate the Due Process Clause if it "offends some 
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamen-
tal." Medina v. California, 505 U. S. (1992) (slip 
op., at 8) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 
197, 202 (1977)). With respect to the initiation of 
charges, however, the specific guarantees contained in 
the Bill of Rights mirror the traditional requirements of 
the criminal process. The common law provided for a 
grand jury indictment and a speedy trial; it did not 
provide a specific evidentiary standard applicable to a 
pretrial hearing on the merits of the charges or subject 
to later review by the courts. See United States v. Wil-
liams, 503 U. S. (1992) (slip op., at 17-18); Costello, 
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supra, at 362-363; United States v. Reed, 27 F. Cas. 
727, 738 (CC NDNY 1852) (Nelson, J.) ("No case has 
been cited, nor have we been able to find any, furnish-
ing an authority for looking into and revising the 
judgment of the grand jury upon the evidence, for the 
purpose of determining whether or not the finding was 
founded upon sufficient proof). 
Moreover, because the Constitution requires a speedy 
trial but no pretrial hearing on the sufficiency of the 
charges (leaving aside the question of extended pretrial 
detention, see County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 
U. S. 44 (1991)), any standard governing the initiation 
of charges would be superfluous in providing protection 
during the criminal process. If the charges are not 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, the charges 
are dismissed; if the charges are proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt at trial, any standard applicable to the 
initiation of charges is irrelevant because it is perforce 
met. This case thus differs in kind from In re Winship, 
397 U. S. 358 (1970), and the other criminal cases 
where we have recognized due process requirements not 
specified in the Bill of Rights. The constitutional 
requirements we enforced in those cases ensured 
fundamental fairness in the determination of guilt at 
trial. See, e.g., Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, 112 
(1935) (due process prohibits "deliberate deception of 
court and jury" by prosecution's knowing use of perjured 
testimony); ante, at 7, n. 6. 
In sum, the due process requirements for criminal pro-
ceedings do not include a standard for the initiation of 
a criminal prosecution. 
II 
That may not be the end of the due process inquiry, 
however. The common law of torts long recognized that 
a malicious prosecution, like a defamatory statement, 
can cause unjustified torment and anguish—both by 
tarnishing one's name and by costing the accused money 
in legal fees and the like. See generally W. Keeton, 
D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on 
the Law of Tbrts §119, pp. 870-889 (5th ed. 1984); 
T. Cooley, Law of Torts 180-187 (1879). We have held, 
of course, that the Due Process Clause protects interests 
other than the interest in freedom from physical re-
straint, see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U. S. 110, 121 
(1989), and for purposes of this case, we can assume 
arguendo that some of the interests granted historical 
protection by the common law of torts (such as the in-
terests in freedom from defamation and malicious prose-
cution) are protected by the Due Process Clause. Even 
so, our precedents make clear that a state actor's 
random and unauthorized deprivation of that interest 
cannot be challenged under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 so long as 
the State provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy. 
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527, 535-544 (1981); see 
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U. S. 517, 531-536 (1984); 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 674-682 (1977); id., 
at 701 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) ("adequate state remedy 
for defamation may satisfy the due process requirement 
when a State has impaired an individual's interest in 
his reputation"). 
The commonsense teaching of Parratt is that some 
questions of property, contract, and tort law are best 
resolved by state legal systems without resort to the 
federal courts, even when a state actor is the alleged 
wrongdoer. As we explained in Parratt, the contrary ap-
proach "would almost necessarily result in turning every 
alleged injury which may have been inflicted by a state 
official acting under 'color of law' into a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment cognizable under §1983. . . . 
Presumably, under this rationale any party who is in-
volved in nothing more than an automobile accident with 
a state official could allege a constitutional violation 
under § 1983. Such reasoning 'would make of the Four-
teenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed 
upon whatever systems may already be administered by 
the States.*" 451 U. S., at 544 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 
424 U. S. 693, 701 (1976)). The Parratt principle re-
spects the delicate balance between state and federal 
courts and comports with the design of § 1983, a statute 
that reinforces a legal tradition in which protection for 
persons and their rights is afforded by the common law 
and the laws of the States, as well as by the Constitu-
tion. See Parratt, supra, at 531-532. 
Yet it is fair to say that courts, including our own, 
have been cautious in invoking the rule of Parratt. See 
Mann v. Tucson, 782 F. 2d 790, 798 (CA9 1986) (Sneed, 
J., concurring). That hesitancy is in part a recognition 
of the important role federal courts have assumed in 
elaborating vital constitutional guarantees against 
arbitrary or oppressive state action. We want to leave 
an avenue open for recourse where we think the federal 
power ought to be vindicated. Cf. Screws v. United 
States, 325 U. S. 91 (1945). 
But the price of our ambivalence over the outer limits 
of Parratt has been its dilution and, in some respects, 
its transformation into a mere pleading exercise. The 
Parratt rule has been avoided by attaching a substantive 
rather than procedural label to due process claims (a 
distinction that if accepted in this context could render 
Parratt a dead letter) and by treating claims based on 
the Due Process Clause as claims based on some other 
constitutional provision. See Taylor v. Knapp, 871 F. 2d 
803, 807 (CA9 1989) (Sneed, J., concurring). It has been 
avoided at the other end of the spectrum by construing 
complaints alleging a substantive injury as attacks on 
the adequacy of state procedures. See Zinermon v. 
Burch, 494 U. S. 113, 139-151 (1990) (O'CONNOR, J., dis-
senting); Easter House v. Felder, 910 F. 2d 1387, 1408 
(CA7 1990) (Easterbrook, J., concurring). These evasions 
are unjustified given the clarity of the Parratt rule: In 
the ordinary case where an injury has been caused not 
by a state law, policy, or procedure, but by a random 
and unauthorized act that can be remedied by state law, 
there is no basis for intervention under §1983, at least 
in a suit based on "the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment simpliciter.n 451 U. S., at 536. 
As Parratt's precedential force must be acknowledged, 
I think it disposes of this case. Illinois provides a tort 
remedy for malicious prosecution; indeed, Albright 
brought a state law malicious prosecution claim, albeit 
after the statute of limitations had expired. (That fact 
does not affect the adequacy of the remedy under Par-
ratt. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327, 342 (1986) 
(STEVENS, J., concurring).) Given the state remedy and 
the holding of Parratt, there is neither need nor legiti-
macy in invoking §1983 in this case. See 975 F. 2d 
343, 347 (CA7 1992). 
Ill 
That said, if a State did not provide a tort remedy for 
malicious prosecution, there would be force to the argu-
ment that the malicious initiation of a baseless criminal 
prosecution infringes an interest protected by the Due 
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Process Clause and enforceable under § 1983. Compare 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S., at 676, id., at 701-702 
(STEVENS, J., dissenting), and Board of Regents of State 
Colleges v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 573 (1972), with Paul v. 
Davis, 424 U. S. 693, 711-712 (1976); see PruneYard 
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 93-94 (1980) 
(Marshall, J., concurring); Martinez v. California, 444 
U. S. 277, 281-282 (1980); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 
113, 134 (1877). But given the state tort remedy, we 
need not conduct that inquiry in this case. 
• • * 
For these reasons, I concur in the judgment of the 
Court holding that the dismissal of petitioner Albright's 
complaint was proper. 
JUSTICE SOUTER, concurring in the judgment. 
While I agree with the Court's judgment that petition-
er has not justified recognition of a substantive due 
process violation in his prosecution without probable 
cause, I reach that result by a route different from that 
of the plurality. The Court has previously rejected the 
proposition that the Constitution's application to a 
general subject (like prosecution) is necessarily ex-
hausted by protection under particular textual guaran-
tees addressing specific events within that subject (like 
search and seizure), on a theory that one specific 
constitutional provision can pre-empt a broad field as 
against another more general one. See United States v. 
James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U. S. , 
(1993) (slip op., at 5) ("We have rejected the view that 
the applicability of one constitutional amendment pre-
empts the guarantees of another"); Soldal v. Cook 
County, 506 U. S. , (1992) (slip op., at 14) 
("Certain wrongs affect more than a single right and, 
accordingly, can implicate more than one of the 
Constitution's commands. Where such multiple viola-
tions are alleged, we are not in the habit of identifying 
as a preliminary matter the claim's 'dominant' character. 
Rather, we examine each constitutional provision in 
turn"). It has likewise rejected the view that incorpora-
tion of the substantive guarantees of the first eight 
amendments of the Constitution defines the limits of due 
process protection, see Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 
46, 89-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). The second 
Justice Harlan put it this way: 
"[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the 
Due Process Clause . . . is not a series of isolated 
points . . . . It is a rational continuum which, 
broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all 
substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless 
restraints . . . ." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 543 
(1961) (dissenting opinion). 
We are, nonetheless, required by *[t]he doctrine of 
judicial self-restraint . . . to exercise the utmost care 
whenever we are asked to break new ground in [the] 
field" of substantive due process. Collins v. Harker 
Heights, 503 U. S. , (1992) (slip op., at 9). Just 
as the concept of due process does not protect against 
insubstantial impositions on liberty, neither should the 
"rational continuum" be reduced to the mere duplication 
of protections adequately addressed by other constitu-
tional provisions. Justice Harlan could not infer that 
the due process guarantee was meant to protect against 
insubstantial burdens, and we are not free to infer that 
it was meant to be applied without thereby adding a 
substantial increment to protection otherwise available. 
The importance of recognizing the latter limitation is 
underscored by pragmatic concerns about subjecting 
government actors to two (potentially inconsistent) 
standards for the same conduct and needlessly imposing 
on trial courts the unenviable burden of reconciling well-
established jurisprudence under the Fourth and Eighth 
Amendments with the ill-defined contours of some novel 
due process right.1 
This rule of reserving due process for otherwise 
homeless substantial claims no doubt informs those 
decisions, see Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989), 
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975), and Whitley v. 
Albers, 475 U. S. 312, 327 (1986), in which the Court 
has resisted against relying on the Due Process Clause 
when doing so would have duplicated protection that a 
more specific constitutional provision already bestowed.2 
This case calls for just such restraint, in presenting no 
substantial burden on liberty beyond what the Fourth 
Amendment is generally thought to redress already. 
In framing his claim of infringement of a liberty 
interest in freedom from the initiation of a baseless 
prosecution, petitioner has chosen to disclaim any 
reliance on the Fourth Amendment seizure that followed 
when he surrendered himself into police custody. 
Petitioner has failed, however, to allege any substantial 
'JUSTICE STEVENS suggests that these concerns are not for this 
Court, since Congress resolved them in deciding to provide a remedy 
for constitutional violations under §1983. Post, at 22-23. The ques-
tion before the Court, however, is not about the existence of a 
statutory remedy for an admitted constitutional violation, but 
whether a particular violation of substantive due process, as distinct 
from the Fourth Amendment, should be recognized on the facts 
pleaded. This question is indisputably within the province of the 
Court, and should be addressed with regard for the concerns about 
unnecessary duplication in constitutional adjudication reflected in 
Graham, Gerstein, and Whitley. Nothing in Congress's enactment of 
§1983 suggests otherwise. 
8Recognizing these concerns makes sense of what at first blush 
may seem a tension between our decisions in Graham v. Connor, 
490 U. S. 386 (1989), and Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975), on 
the one hand, and United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop-
erty, 510 U. S. (1993), and Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U. S. 
(1992), on the other. The Court held in Graham that all claims of 
excessive force by law enforcement officials in the course of a 
"seizure" should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's "rea-
sonableness" standard. "Because the Fourth Amendment provides 
an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this 
sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, 
not the more generalized notion of 'substantive due process,' must be 
the guide to analyzing these claims." Graham v. Connor, supra, at 
395. The Gerstein Court held that the Fourth Amendment, not the 
Due Process Clause, determines what post-arrest proceedings are re-
quired for suspects detained on criminal charges. Gerstein v. Pugh, 
supra. As we recently explained in United States v. James Daniel 
Good Real Property, supra, at (slip op., at 6), the Court rea-
soned in Gerstein that the Fourth Amendment "balance between in-
dividual and public interests always has been thought to define the 
'process that is due' for seizures of person or property in criminal 
cases." See Gerstein, supra, at 125, n. 27. Thus, in both Gerstein 
and Graham, separate analysis under the Due Process Clause was 
dispensed with as redundant The Court has reached the same re-
sult in the context of claims of unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain in penal institutions. See Whitley v. Albert, 475 U. S. 312, 327 
(1986) ("It would indeed be surprising if . . . 'conduct that shocks 
the conscience' or 'afTord[s] brutality the cloak of law,' and so vio-
lates the Fourteenth Amendment, Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 
165, 172, 173 (1952), were not also punishment Inconsistent with 
contemporary standards of decency' and Yepugnant to the conscience 
of mankind,' Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S., at 103, 106, in violation 
of the Eighth"). 
1-26-94 54CrL2067 
injury that is attributable to the former event, but not 
the latter. His complaint presents an extensive list of 
damages: limitations on his liberty, freedom of associa-
tion, and freedom of movement by virtue of the terms of 
his bond; financial expense of his legal defense; reputa-
tional harm among members of the community; inability 
to transact business or obtain employment in his local 
area, necessitating relocation to St. Louis; inability to 
secure credit; and personal pain and suffering. See App. 
to Pet. for Cert. 49a-50a. None of these injuries, 
however, is alleged to have followed from the issuance 
of the formal instrument of prosecution, as distinct from 
the ensuing assertion of custody. Thus, petitioner has 
not shown a substantial deprivation of liberty from the 
mere initiation of prosecution. 
The significance of this failure follows from the 
recognition that none of petitioner's alleged injuries has 
been treated by the Courts of Appeals as beyond the 
ambit of compensability under the general rule of 42 
U. S. C. § 1983 liability for a seizure unlawful under 
Fourth Amendment standards, see Tennessee v. Garner, 
471 U. S. 1 (1985) (affirming §1983 liability based on 
Fourth Amendment violation); Brower v. County ofInyo, 
489 U. S. 593, 599 (1989) (unreasonable seizure in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment gives rise to § 1983 
liability). On the contrary, the Courts of Appeals have 
held that injuries like those petitioner alleges are 
cognizable in §1983 claims founded upon arrests that 
are bad under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Hale 
v. Fish, 899 F. 2d 390, 403-404 (CA5 1990) (affirming 
award of damages for mental anguish, harm to reputa-
tion, and legal fees for defense); B. C. R. Transport Co., 
Inc. v. Fontaine, 727 F. 2d 7, 12 (CA1 1984) (affirming 
award of damages for destruction of business due to 
publicity surrounding illegal search); Sims v. Mulcahy, 
902 F. 2d 524, 532-533 (CA7 1990) (approving damages 
for pain, suffering, and mental anguish in the context of 
a challenge to jury instructions); Sevigny v. Dicksey, 846 
F. 2d 953, 959 (CA4 1988) (affirming damages for 
extreme emotional distress); Dennis v. Warren, 779 F. 2d 
245, 248-249 (CA5 1985) (affirming award of damages 
for pain, suffering, humiliation, and embarrassment); 
Konczak v. Tyrrell, 603 F. 2d 13, 17 (CA7 1979) (affirm-
ing damages for lost wages, mental distress, humiliation, 
loss of reputation, and general pain and suffering). 
Indeed, it is not surprising that rules of recovery for 
such harms have naturally coalesced under the Fourth 
Amendment, since the injuries usually occur only after 
an arrest or other Fourth Amendment seizure, an event 
that normally follows promptly (3 days in this case) 
upon the formality of filing an indictment, information, 
or complaint. There is no restraint on movement until 
a seizure occurs or bond terms are imposed. Damage to 
reputation and all of its attendant harms also tend to 
show up after arrest. The defendant's mental anguish 
(whether premised on reputational harm, burden of 
defending, incarceration, or some other consequence of 
prosecution) customarily will not arise before an arrest, 
or at least before the notification that an arrest warrant 
has been issued informs him of the charges. 
There may indeed be exceptional cases where some 
quantum of harm occurs in the interim period after 
groundless criminal charges are filed but before any 
Fourth Amendment seizure. Whether any such unusual 
case may reveal a substantial deprivation of liberty, and 
so justify a court in resting compensation on a want of 
government power or a limitation of it independent of 
the Fourth Amendment, are issues to be faced only 
when they arise. They do not arise in this case and I 
accordingly concur in the judgment of the Court.5 
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN 
joins, dissenting. 
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution constrains 
the power of the Federal Government to accuse a citizen 
of an infamous crime. Under that Amendment, no 
accusation may issue except on a grand jury determina-
tion that there is probable cause to support the accusa-
tion.1 The question presented by this case is whether 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
imposes any comparable constraint on state govern-
ments. 
In Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884), we 
decided that the Due Process Clause does not compel the 
States to proceed by way of grand jury indictment when 
they initiate a prosecution. In reaching that conclusion, 
however, we noted that the substance of the federal 
guarantee was preserved by California's requirement 
that a magistrate certify "to the probable guilt of the 
defendant." Id., at 538. In accord with Hurtado, I 
would hold that Illinois may dispense with the grand 
jury procedure only if the substance of the probable-
cause requirement remains adequately protected.2 
I 
Assuming, as we must, that the allegations of 
petitioner's complaint are true, it is perfectly clear that 
the probable-cause requirement was not satisfied in this 
case. Indeed, it is plain that respondent Oliver, who 
attested to the criminal information against petitioner, 
either knew or should have known that he did not have 
probable cause to initiate criminal proceedings. 
Oliver's only evidence against petitioner came from a 
paid informant who established her unreliability on more 
than 50 occasions, when her false accusations led to 
aborted and dismissed prosecutions.9 Nothing about her 
•JUSTICE STEVENS argues that the fact that few of petitioner's 
injuries flowed solely from the filing of the charges against him does 
not make those injuries insubstantial," post, at 23, n. 29 (emphasis 
in original), and maintains that the arbitrary filing of criminal 
charges may work substantial harm on liberty. Ibid. While I do 
not quarrel with either proposition, neither of them addresses the 
threshold question whether the complaint alleges any substantial 
deprivation beyond the scope of what settled law recognizes at the 
present time. 
'"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, 
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when 
in actual service in time of War or public danger, . . . . " U. S. Const, 
Amdt. 5. See also United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 343 (1974). 
*In Hurtado, 110 U. S., at 532, the Court made this comment on the 
traditions inherited from English law, with particular reference to the 
Magna Charta: 
"Applied in England only as guards against executive usurpation and 
tyranny, here they have become bulwarks also against arbitrary 
legislation; but, in that application, as it would be incongruous to 
measure and restrict them by the ancient customary English law, they 
must be held to guarantee not particular forms of procedure, but the very 
substance of individual rights to life, liberty, and property. 
\ . . Such regulations, to adopt a sentence of Burke's, 'may alter the 
mode and application but have no power over the substance of original 
justice.'" 
'According to the complaint, Oliver, a detective in the Macomb, 
Illinois, Police Department, agreed to provide Veda Moore with 
protection and money in exchange for her assistance in acting as a 
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performance in this case suggested any improvement on 
her record. The substance she described as cocaine 
turned out to be baking soda. She twice misidentified 
her alleged vendor before, in response to a leading 
question, she agreed that petitioner might be he;4 in 
fact, she had never had any contact with petitioner. As 
the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the commence-
ment of a serious criminal proceeding on such "scanty 
grounds" was nothing short of "shocking."5 
These shocking factual allegations give rise to two 
important questions of law: does the commencement of 
formal criminal proceedings deprive the accused person 
of liberty" as that term is used in the Fourteenth 
Amendment; and, if so, are the demands of "due process" 
satisfied solely by compliance with certain procedural 
formalities which ordinarily ensure that a prosecution 
will not commence absent probable cause? I shall 
discuss these questions separately, and then comment on 
the several opinions supporting the Court's judgment. 
II 
Punishment by confinement in prison is a frequent 
conclusion of criminal proceedings. Had petitioner's 
prosecution resulted in his conviction and incarceration, 
then there is no question but that the Due Process 
Clause would have been implicated; a central purpose of 
the Fourteenth Amendment was to deny States the 
power to impose this sort of deprivation of liberty until 
after completion of a fair trial. Over the years, however, 
our cases have made it clear that the interests protected 
by the Due Process Clause extend well beyond freedom 
from an improper criminal conviction. 
As a qualitative matter, we have decided that the 
liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment is signifi-
cantly broader than mere freedom from physical con-
straint. Although its contours have never been defined 
confidential informant. Allegedly, Moore, addicted to cocaine, lied to 
Oliver about her undercover purchases of controlled substances in order 
to receive the promised payment*. During the course of her tenure as an 
informant, Moore falsely implicated over 50 individuals in criminal 
activity, resulting each time in a dismissed prosecution. 
4
 Relying entirely on information provided by Moore, Oliver testified 
before a grand jury and secured an indictment against a first suspect, 
John Albright, Jr., for selling a "look alike" substance in violation of 
Illinois law. When he attempted to arrest John Albright, Jr., however, 
Oliver became convinced that he had the wrong man, and substituted the 
name of a second suspect, Albright's son, on the arrest warrant Once 
again, it became clear that Oliver's suspect could not have committed the 
crime. Oliver then asked Moore whether her vendor might have been a 
different son of the man she had first identified. When Moore admitted 
of that possibility, Oliver attested to the criminal information charging 
petitioner, his third and final suspect, with a felony. 
8
 "Detective Oliver made no effort to corroborate Veda Moore's 
unsubstantiated accusation. Aheap of baking soda was no corroboration. 
Her initial misidentification of the seller cast grave doubt on the 
accuracy of her information. And this was part of a pattern: of fifty 
persons she reported to Oliver as trafficking in drugs, none was 
successfully prosecuted for any crime. In the case of 'Albright/ Oliver 
should have suspected that Moore had bought cocaine either from she 
knew not whom or from someone she was afraid to snitch on (remember 
that she had gone to work for Oliver in the first place because she was 
being threatened by a man to whom she owed money for previous 
purchases of cocaine), that she had consumed it and replaced it with 
baking soda, and that she had then picked a name from the phone book 
at random. The fact that she used her informant's reward to buy cocaine 
makes this hypothesis all the more plausible. An arrest is a serious 
business. To arrest a person on the scanty grounds that are alleged to 
be all that Oliver had to go on is shocking." 975 F. 2d 343, 345 (CA7 
1992). 
precisely, that liberty surely includes the right to make 
basic decisions about the future; to participate in 
community affairs; to take advantage of employment 
opportunities; to cultivate family, business, and social 
relationships; and to travel from place to place.0 On a 
quantitative level, we have, to be sure, acknowledged 
that not every modest impairment of individual liberty 
amounts to a deprivation raising constitutional concerns. 
Cf. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U. S. 215 (1976). At the 
same time, however, we have recognized that a variety 
of state actions have such serious effects on protected 
liberty interests that they may not be undertaken 
arbitrarily,7 or without observing procedural 
safeguards.9 
In my opinion, the formal commencement of a criminal 
proceeding is quintessentially this type of state action. 
The initiation of a criminal prosecution, regardless of 
whether it prompts an arrest, immediately produces aa 
wrenching disruption of everyday life." Young v. United 
States ex reL Vuitton et Fils, 481 U. S. 787, 814 (1987). 
Every prosecution, like every arrest, "is a public act that 
may seriously interfere with the defendant's liberty, 
whether he is free on bail or not, and that may disrupt 
his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his 
associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create 
anxiety in him, his family and his friends." United 
States v. Marion, 404 U. S. 307, 320 (1971). In short, 
an official accusation of serious crime has a direct 
impact on a range of identified liberty interests. That 
impact, moreover, is of sufficient magnitude to qualify as 
a deprivation of liberty meriting constitutional protec-
tion.9 
'As we stated in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923): 
"While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the 
liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and 
some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, 
it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of 
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations 
of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring 
up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own 
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at 
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free 
men.* Id, at 399 (citations omitted). 
TSee, e,g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 94-99 (1987) (invalidating 
prison regulation of inmate marriages); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 
U. S. 494, 500 (1977) (striking down ordinance that prohibited certain 
relatives from residing together because it had only a "tenuous relation* 
to its goals); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 191 (1952) (requiring 
loyalty oaths of public employees violates due process because 
"[ijindiscriminate classification of innocent with knowing activity must 
fall as an assertion of arbitrary power"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
U. S. 510, 534-535 (1925) (state law requiring parents to send children 
to public school violates due process because "rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable 
relation to some purpose within the competency of the State*). 
'See, a,*., Cleveland Bd of Ed v. Loudermill, 470 U. S. 532, 542 
(1985) ("An essentia] principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, 
liberty, or property t>e preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing 
appropriate to the nature of the case'*) (quoting Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Bank & Trust Ca, 339 U. S. 306, 313 (1950)); Goes v. Lopez, 419 
U. S. 565, 581 (1975) (TDJue process requires, in connection with a 
suspension of 10 days or less, that the student be given oral or written 
notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation 
of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present hit 
side of the story"); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433, 436-437 
(1971) ("Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is 
at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an 
opportunity to be heard are essential"). 
*The Court of Appeals was persuaded that the Court's reasoning in 
Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693 (1976), required a different conclusion. 975 
F. 2d, at 345. Even if one accepts the dubious proposition that an 
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Ill 
The next question, of course, is what measure of "due 
process" must be provided an accused in connection with 
this deprivation of liberty. In In re Winship, 397 U. S. 
358, 361-364 (1970), we relied on both history and 
certain societal interests to find that, in the context of 
criminal conviction, due process entails proof of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The same considerations 
support a requirement that criminal prosecution be 
predicated, at a minimum, on a rinding of probable 
cause. 
It has been the historical practice in our jurisprudence 
to withhold the filing of criminal charges until the state 
can marshal evidence establishing probable cause that 
an identifiable defendant has committed a crime. This 
long tradition is reflected in the common law tort of 
malicious prosecution,10 as well as in our cases.11 In 
addition, the probable cause requirement serves valuable 
societal interests, protecting the populace from the whim 
and caprice of governmental agents without unduly 
burdening the government's prosecutorial function.12 
Consistent with our reasoning in Winship, these factors 
lead to the conclusion that one element of the "due 
process" prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment is a 
responsible decision that there is probable cause to 
prosecute.13 
Illinois has established procedures intended to ensure 
that evidence of "the probable guilt of the defendant," 
see Hurtado, 110 U. S., at 538, has been assembled 
before a criminal prosecution is pursued.14 Petitioner 
individual's interest in his or her reputation simpliciier is not an interest 
in liberty, Paul v. Davis recognized that liberty is infringed by govern* 
mental conduct that injures reputation in conjunction with other 
interests. 424 U. S., at 701. The commencement of a criminal prosecu-
tion is certainly such conduct. 
10
 See, e.g., W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and 
Keeton on Law of Torts § 119 pp. 876-882 (5th ed. 1984). 
11
 Wayie v. United States, 470 U. S. 598, 607 (1985); Bordenkircher v. 
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) ("In our system, so long as the 
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an 
offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and 
what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely 
in his discretion"); GersUin v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 119 (1975) ("The 
standard of proof required of the prosecution is usually referred to as 
'probable cause/ but in some jurisdictions it may approach a prima facie 
case of guilt"); see also United States v. Lovasco, 431 U. S. 783, 791 
(1977) (noting that "it is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to 
recommend an indictment on less than probable cause") (footnote 
omitted); United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 343 (1974) (noting 
that one of the "grand jury's historic functions" was to determine 
whether probable cause existed); Dins man v. Wilkes, 12 How. 390, 402 
(1852) (noting that instigation of a criminal prosecution without probable 
cause creates an action for malicious prosecution). 
"Because probable cause is already required for an arrest, and proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt for a conviction, the burden on law enforce-
ment is not appreciably enhanced by a requirement of probable cause for 
prosecution. 
191 thus disagree with dicta to the contrary in a footnote in Gerstein v. 
Pugh, 420 U. S., at 125, n. 26 ("Because the probable cause determina-
tion is not a constitutional prerequisite to the charging decision, it is 
required only for those suspects who suffer restraints on liberty other 
than the condition that they appear for trial"). As I have explained, the 
commencement of criminal proceedings itself infringes on liberty 
interests, regardless of the restraints imposed. 
14
 At the time of this suit, Illinois law allowed the filing of felony 
charges only by information or indictment. El, Rev. Stat., Ch. 38, 
§ lll-2(a) (1987). If the filing were by information, as was the case here, 
then the charges could be filed but not pursued until a preliminary 
hearing had been held or waived pursuant to Ch. 38, § 109-3, and, if 
held, had concluded in a finding of probable cause to believe that the 
defendant had committed an offense. Ch. 38, §§ 111-2U), $ 109-3. 
does not challenge the general adequacy of these 
procedures. Rather, he claims that the probable cause 
determination in his case was invalid as a substantive 
matter, because it was wholly unsupported by reliable 
evidence and tainted by Oliver's disregard or suppression 
of facts bearing on the reliability of his informant. This 
contention requires us to consider whether a state's 
compliance with facially valid procedures for initiating 
a prosecution is by itself sufficient to meet the demands 
of due process, without regard to the substance of the 
resulting probable cause determination. 
Fortunately, our prior cases have rejected such a 
formalistic approach to the Due Process Clause. In 
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, 110 (1935), a crimi-
nal defendant claimed that the prosecutor's knowing use 
of perjured testimony, and deliberate suppression of 
evidence that would have impeached that testimony, 
constituted a denial of due process. The State urged us 
to reject this submission on the ground that the 
petitioner's trial had been free of procedural error. Our 
treatment of the State's argument should dispose of the 
analogous defense advanced today: 
"Without attempting at this time to deal with the 
question at length, we deem it sufficient for the 
present purpose to say that we are unable to 
approve this narrow view of the requirement of due 
process. That requirement, in safeguarding the 
liberty of the citizen against deprivation through the 
action of the State, embodies the fundamental 
conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our 
civil and political institutions. Hebert v. Louisiana, 
272 U. S. 312, 316, 317 [1926]. It is a requirement 
that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice 
and hearing if a State has contrived a conviction 
through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but 
used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty 
through a deliberate deception of court and jury by 
the presentation of testimony known to be perjured. 
Such a contrivance by a State to procure the convic-
tion and imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsis-
tent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is 
the obtaining of a like result by intimidation." Id., 
at 112. 
In the years since Mooney, we have consistently reaf-
firmed this understanding of the requirements of due 
process. Our cases make clear that procedural regular-
ity notwithstanding, the Due Process Clause is violated 
by the knowing use of perjured testimony or the deliber-
ate suppression of evidence favorable to the accused.15 
It is, in other words, well established that adherence to 
procedural forms will not save a conviction that rests in 
substance on false evidence or deliberate deception. 
uSee, e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 103, and n. 8 (1976) 
(citing cases); Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150, 153-154 (1972) 
(failure to disclose Government agreement with witness violates due 
process); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83,87 (1963) ("suppression by the 
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due 
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution"); Napue v. 
Illinois, 360 U. S. 264 (1959) (failure of state to correct testimony known 
to be false violates due process); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U. S. 213, 215-216 
(1942) (allegations of the knowing use of perjured testimony and the 
suppression of evidence favorable to the accused "sufficiently charge a 
deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, and, if 
proven, would entitle petitioner to release from his present custody*). 
But cf. United States v. Williams, 504 U. S. (1992) (prosecutor need 
not present exculpatory evidence in his possession to the grand jury). 
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Just as perjured testimony may invalidate an other-
wise proper conviction, so also may the absence of proof 
render a criminal conviction unconstitutional. The 
traditional assumption that "proof of a criminal charge 
beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required," 
Winship, 397 U. S., at 362, has been endorsed explicitly, 
and tied directly to the Due Process Clause. Id., at 
364.16 When the quantum of proof supporting a convic-
tion falls sufficiently far below this standard, then the 
Due Process Clause requires that the conviction be set 
aside, even in the absence of any procedural error. 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (1979). 
In short, we have already recognized that certain 
substantive defects can vitiate the protection ordinarily 
afforded by a trial, so that formal compliance with 
procedural rules is no longer enough to satisfy the 
demands of due process. The same is true of a facially 
valid determination of probable cause. Even if pre-
scribed procedures are followed meticulously, a criminal 
prosecution based on perjured testimony, or evidence on 
which "no rational trier of fact" could base a finding of 
probable cause, cf. id., at 324, simply does not comport 
with the requirements of the Due Process Clause. 
IV 
I do not understand the plurality to take issue with 
the proposition that commencement of a criminal case 
deprives the accused of liberty, or that the state has a 
duty to make a probable cause determination before 
filing charges. Instead, both the CHIEF JUSTICE and 
JUSTICE SCALIA identify petitioner's reliance on a 
"substantive due process" theory as the critical flaw in 
his argument. Because there is no substantive due 
process right available to petitioner, they conclude, his 
due process claim can be rejected in its entirety and 
without further consideration. 
In my opinion, this approach places undue weight on 
the label petitioner has attached to his claim.17 The 
Fourteenth Amendment contains only one Due Process 
Clause. Though it is sometimes helpful, as a matter of 
doctrine, to distinguish between substantive and proce-
dural due process, see Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 
327, 337-340 (1986) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judg-
ments), the two concepts are not mutually exclusive, and 
their protections often overlap. 
Indeed, the Fourth Amendment, upon which the 
plurality principally relies, provides both procedural and 
substantive protections, and these protections converge. 
When the Court first held that the right to be free from 
unreasonable official searches was "implicit in 'the 
concept of ordered liberty,'" and therefore protected by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 27-28 (1949), it refused 
to require the States to provide the procedures accorded 
""Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the 
reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process 
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with 
which he is charged.* In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 364. 
17
 In any event, it should be noted that in presenting his question for 
review, petitioner invokes the Due Process Clause generally, without 
reference to "substantive* due process. See Pet for Cert i. 
in federal trials to protect that right.18 Id., at 28-33. 
Significantly, however, when we overruled the procedural 
component of that decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 
643 (1961), we made it clear that we were "extending 
the substantive protections of due process to all constitu-
tionally unreasonable searches—state or federal . . . " 
Id., at 655 (emphasis added). 
Moreover, in Winship, we found it unnecessary to 
clarify whether our holding rested on substantive or 
procedural due process grounds; it was enough to say 
that the "Due Process Clause" itself requires proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 397 U. S., at 364. Simi-
larly, whether the analogous probable cause standard 
urged by petitioner is more appropriately characterized 
as substantive or procedural is not a matter of overrid-
ing significance. In either event, the same Due Process 
Clause operates to protect the individual against the 
abuse of governmental power, by guaranteeing that no 
criminal prosecution shall be initiated except on a 
finding of probable cause. 
V 
According to the plurality, the application of certain 
portions of the Bill of Rights to the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment "has substituted, in these areas 
of criminal procedure, the specific guarantees of the 
various provisions of the Bill of Rights . . . for the more 
generalized language contained in the earlier cases 
construing the Fourteenth Amendment." Ante, at 6-7. 
The plurality then reasons, in purported reliance on 
Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989), that because 
the Fourth Amendment is designed to address pretrial 
deprivations of liberty, petitioner's claim must be 
analyzed under that Amendment alone. Ante, at 7. In 
the end, however, the CHIEF JUSTICE concludes that he 
need not consider petitioner's claim under the Fourth 
Amendment after all, because that question was not 
presented in the petition for certiorari. Ante, at 8. 
There are two glaring flaws in the plurality's analysis. 
First, the pretrial deprivation of liberty at issue in this 
case is addressed by a particular amendment, but not 
the Fourth; rather, it is addressed by the Grand Jury 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. That the Framers saw 
fit to provide a specific procedural guarantee against 
arbitrary accusations indicates the importance they 
attached to the liberty interest at stake. Though we 
have not required the States to use the grand jury 
procedure itself, it by no means follows that the underly-
ing liberty interest is unworthy of Fourteenth Amend-
ment protection. As we explained in Hurtado, "bul-
warks* of protection such as the Magna Charta and the 
Due Process Clause "guarantee not particular forms of 
procedure, but the very substance of individual rights to 
life, liberty, and property."1* 
Second, and of greater importance, the cramped view 
of the Fourteenth Amendment taken by the plurality has 
been rejected time and time again by this Court. In his 
famous dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California, 332 
U. S. 46, 89-92 (1947), Justice Black took the position 
'•Our refusal in Wolf io require States to adopt a federal rule of 
procedure—the exclusionary rule—paralleled our earlier refusal in 
Hurtado to require States to adopt a federal rule of procedure—the 
grand jury process for ascertaining probable cause. Nevertheless, 
both cases recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment protected the 
substantive rights as implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 
MHurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 532 (1884). See n. 2, supra. 
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that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment makes the entire Bill of Rights applicable to the 
States. As a corollary, he advanced a theory not unlike 
that endorsed today by the CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE 
SCALIA: that the express guarantees of the Bill of 
Rights mark the outer limit of Due Process Clause 
protection. Ibid. What is critical, for present purposes, 
is that the Adamson majority rejected this contention, 
and held instead that the "ordered liberty'' protected by 
the Due Process Clause is not coextensive with the 
specific provisions of the first eight Amendments to the 
Constitution. Justice Frankfurter's concurrence made 
this point perfectly clear: 
"It may not be amiss to restate the pervasive 
function of the Fourteenth Amendment in exacting 
from the States observance of basic liberties. . . . 
The Amendment neither comprehends the specific 
provisions by which the founders deemed it appro-
priate to restrict the federal government nor is it 
confined to them. The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment has an independent potency 
" Id., at 66. 
In the years since Adamson, the Court has shown no 
inclination to reconsider its repudiation of Justice 
Black's position.30 Instead, the Court has identified 
numerous violations of due process that have no counter-
parts in the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. 
And contrary to the suggestion of the plurality, ante, at 
5, 7, these decisions have not been limited to the realm 
outside criminal law. As I have already discussed, it is 
the Due Process Clause itself, and not some explicit 
provision of the Bill of Rights, that forbids the use of 
perjured testimony and the suppression of evidence 
favorable to the accused.21 Similarly, we have held 
that the Due Process Clause requires an impartial 
judge,22 and prohibits the use of unnecessarily sugges-
tive identification procedures.23 Characteristically, 
Justice Black was the sole dissenter when the Court 
concluded in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333 (1966), 
that the failure to control disruptive influences in the 
courtroom constitutes a denial of due process. 
Perhaps most important, and virtually ignored by the 
plurality today, is our holding in In re Winship that "the 
Due Process Clause protects the accused against convic-
tion except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt." 397 
U. S., at 364. Because the reasonable-doubt standard 
has no explicit textual source in the Bill of Rights, the 
Winship Court was faced with precisely the same 
argument now advanced by the CHIEF JUSTICE and 
JUSTICE SCALIA: noting the procedural guarantees for 
which the Bill of Rights specifically provides in criminal 
cases, Justice Black maintained that *[t]he Constitution 
thus goes into some detail to spell out what kind of trial 
a defendant charged with crime should have, and I 
believe the Court has no power to add to or subtract 
*° Indeed, no other Justice has joined Justice Black in maintaining that 
the scope of the Due Process Clause is limited to the specific guarantees 
of the Bill of Rights. Although Justice Douglas joined Justice Black in 
dissent in Adamson, he later retreated from this position. See, e,g., 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 484 (1965); L. Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law, §11-2 p. 774 and n. 32 (2d ed. 1988). 
, lSee n. 15, supra. 
"Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927). 
"Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 302 (1967). Justice Black dissented. 
Id, at 303-306. 
from the procedures set forth by the Founders." Id., at 
377 (dissenting opinion). Holding otherwise, the 
Winship majority resoundingly rejected this position, 
which Justice Harlan characterized as "flfying] in the 
face of a course of judicial history reflected in an 
unbroken line of opinions that have interpreted due 
process to impose restraints on the procedures govern-
ment may adopt in its dealing with its citizens . . . ." 
Id., at 373, n. 5 (concurring opinion). 
Nevertheless, the CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE SCALIA 
seem intent on resuscitating a theory that has never 
been viable, by reading our opinion in Graham v. 
Connor more broadly than our actual holding. In 
Graham, which involved a claim of excessive force in the 
context of an arrest or investigatory stop, we held that 
a[b]ecause the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit 
textual source of constitutional protection against this 
sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that 
Amendment, not the more generalized notion of 'substan-
tive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these 
claims." 490 U. S., at 395. Under Graham, then, the 
existence of a specific protection in the Bill of Rights 
that is incorporated by the Due Process Clause may 
preclude what would in any event be redundant reliance 
on a more general conception of liberty.24 Nothing in 
Graham, however, forecloses a general due process claim 
when a more specific source of protection is absent or, 
as here, open to question. See ante, at 8 (reserving 
question whether Fourth Amendment protects against 
filing of charges without probable cause). 
At bottom, the plurality opinion seems to rest on one 
fundamental misunderstanding: that the incorporation 
cases have somehow "substituted" the specific provisions 
of the Bill of Rights for the "more generalized language 
contained in the earlier cases construing the Fourteenth 
Amendment.* Ante, at 7. In fact, the incorporation 
cases themselves rely on the very "generalized language" 
the CHIEF JUSTICE would have them displacing.25 
Those cases add to the liberty protected by the Due 
Process Clause most of the specific guarantees of the 
first eight Amendments, but they do not purport to take 
anything away; that a liberty interest is not the subject 
of an incorporated provision of the Bill of Rights does 
not remove it from the ambit of the Due Process Clause. 
I cannot improve on Justice Harlan's statement of this 
settled proposition: 
*
4
 Moreover, it likely made no difference to the outcome in Graham that 
the Court rested its decision on the Fourth Amendment rather than the 
Due Process Clause. The text of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition 
against "unreasonable" seizures is no more specific than the Due Process 
Clause's prohibition against deprivations of liberty without "due process." 
Under either provision, the appropriate standards for evaluating 
excessive force claims must be developed through the same common law 
process of case-by-case adjudication. 
"See, egM Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 655 (1961) (applying the 
exclusionary rule to the States because "without that rule the freedom 
from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral... as not to merit 
this Court's high regard as a freedom 'implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty"); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784, 794 (1969) (holding that 
"the double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth Amendment represents a 
fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage, and that it should apply 
to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment"); Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U. S. 145,149 (1968) ("Because we believe that trial by jury in 
criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice, we hold 
that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all 
criminal cases which—were they to be tried in a federal court—would 
come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee"). 
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"ITJhe full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the 
Due Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by 
the preqse terms of the specific guarantees else-
where provided in the Constitution. This 'liberty* is 
not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms 
of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, 
press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; 
the freedom from unreasonable searches and sei-
zures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which, 
broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all 
substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless 
restraints . . . and which also recognizes, what a 
reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that 
certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny 
of the state needs asserted to justify their abridg-
ment.- Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 543 (1961) 
(dissenting opinion). 
I have no doubt that an official accusation of an infa-
mous crime constitutes a deprivation of liberty worthy 
of constitutional protection. The Framers of the Bill of 
Rights so concluded, and there is no reason to believe 
that the sponsors of the Fourteenth Amendment held a 
different view. The Due Process Clause of that Amend-
ment should therefore be construed to require a respon-
sible determination of probable cause before such a 
deprivation is effected. 
VI 
A separate comment on JUSTICE GlNSBURG's opinion is 
appropriate. I agree with her explanation of why the 
initial seizure of petitioner continued until his discharge 
and why the seizure was constitutionally unreasonable. 
Had it been conducted by a federal officer, it would have 
violated the Fourth Amendment. And, because unrea-
sonable official seizures by state officers are deprivations 
of liberty or property without due process of law, the 
seizure of petitioner violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Accordingly, JUSTICE GlNSBURG is correct in concluding 
that the complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action 
under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. 
Having concluded that the complaint states a cause of 
action, however, her opinion does not adequately explain 
why a dismissal of that complaint should be affirmed. 
Her submission, as I understand it, rests on the proposi-
tions that (1) petitioner abandoned a meritorious claim 
based on the component of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment that is coterminous with the 
Fourth Amendment; and (2) the Due Process Clause 
provides no protection for deprivations of liberty associ-
ated with the initiation of a criminal prosecution unless 
an unreasonable seizure occurs. For reasons already 
stated, I firmly disagree with the second proposition. 
In the Bill of Rights, the Framers provided constitu-
tional protection against unfounded felony accusations in 
the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment and 
separate protection against unwarranted arrests in the 
Fourth Amendment. Quite obviously, they did not 
regard the latter protection as sufficient to avoid the 
harm associated with an irresponsible official accusation 
of serious criminal conduct. Therefore, although in most 
cases an arrest or summons to appear in court may 
promptly follow the initiation of criminal proceedings, 
the accusation itself causes a harm that is analytically, 
and often temporally, distinct from the arrest. In this 
very case, the petitioner suffered a significant injury 
before he voluntarily surrendered.28 In other cases a 
significant interval may separate the formal accusation 
from the arrest, possibly because the accused is out of 
the jurisdiction or because of administrative delays in 
effecting the arrest.27 
Because the constitutional protection against unfounded 
accusations is distinct from, and somewhat broader than, 
the protection against unreasonable seizures, there is no 
reason why an abandonment of a claim based on the 
seizure should constitute a waiver of the claim based on 
the accusation. Moreover, a case holding that allega-
tions of police misconduct in connection with an arrest 
or seizure are adequately reviewed under the Fourth 
Amendment's reasonableness standard, Graham v. Con-
nor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989), tells us nothing about how 
unwarranted accusations should be evaluated. 
Graham merely held that the due process right to be 
free from police applications of excessive force when 
state officers effect a seizure is governed by the same 
reasonableness standard as that governing seizures 
effected by federal officers. Id., at 394-395. In the 
unlawful seizure context exemplified by Graham, there 
is no need to differentiate between a so-called Fourth 
Amendment theory and a substantive due process theory 
because they are coextensive.28 Whether viewed 
through a Fourth Amendment lens or a substantive due 
process lens, the substantive right protected is the same. 
When, however, the scope of the Fourth Amendment 
protection does not fully encompass the liberty interest 
at stake—as in this case—it is both unwise and unfair 
to place a blinder on the lens that focuses on the 
"The petitioner was deprived of a constitutionally protected 
liberty interest at the moment that he was formally charged with a 
crime—an event that occurred prior to his seizure, and several 
months prior to the preliminary hearing. I agree with JUSTICE 
GlNSBURG that the officer's incomplete testimony at the preliminary 
hearing perpetuated the violation of petitioner's right to be free from 
unreasonable seizure, ante, at 4, but it also perpetuated the viola-
tion of his right to be free from prosecution absent probable cause. 
As such, contrary to her suggestion, ante, at 2, n. 1, either consti-
tutional violation—the prosecution absent probable cause or the 
unreasonable seizure—can independently support an action under 42 
U. S. C. §1983. 
Furthermore, although JUSTICE GlNSBURG speculates that respon-
dent may be fully protected from damages liability by an immunity 
defense, ante, at 4-5, n. 5, that issue is neither free of difficulty, cf. 
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U. S. (1993), nor properly before 
us. See Plurality Opinion, ante, at 2, n. 3. The question on which 
we granted certiorari is whether the initiation of criminal charges 
absent probable cause is a deprivation of liberty protected by the 
Due Process Clause. Neither the fact that the seizure caused by 
petitioner's arrest also deprived him of liberty, nor the possible 
availability of an affirmative defense, is a sufficient reason for 
failing to discuss or decide this question. The question whether one 
is protected by the Due Process Clause from unfounded prosecutions 
has implications beyond whether damages are ultimately obtainable. 
Indeed, in this very case petitioner's complaint sought injunctive 
relief in addition to damages. 
27See, e,g.t Doggett v. United States, 505 U. S. (1992) (time lag 
between indictment and arrest of 8Vi years due in part to the 
defendant's absence from the country and in part to the 
Government's negligence). 
M l t is worthwhile to emphasize that the Fourth Amendment itself 
does not apply to state actors. It is only because the Court has 
held that the privacy rights protected against federal invasion by 
that Amendment are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
that the Fourth Amendment has any relevance in this case. Strictly 
speaking, petitioner's claim is based entirely and exclusively on the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 
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specific right being asserted. Although history teaches 
us that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments have been 
viewed "as running 'almost into each other/" Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U. S., at 646, quoting Boyd v. United States, 
116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886), and citing Entick v. 
Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (C. P. 1765), we have 
never previously thought that the area of overlapping 
protection should constrain the independent protection 
provided by either. 
VII 
Although JUSTICE SOUTER leaves open the possibility 
that in some future case, a due process claim could be 
stated for a prosecution absent probable cause, he 
concludes that this is not such a case. He is persuaded 
that the federal remedy for Fourth Amendment viola-
tions provides an adequate justification for refusing to 
•"break new ground*" by recognizing the "novel due 
process right" asserted by petitioner. Ante, at 2. Like 
the CHIEF JUSTICE, ante, at 5, 8, and JUSTICE GINSBURG, 
ante at 6, he points to Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 
U. S. (1992), as a pertinent example of our reluc-
tance "to expand the concept of substantive due process 
. . . in [an] unchartered area." Id., at (slip op., at 
9). Our relevant holding in that case was that a city's 
failure to provide an employee with a reasonably safe 
place to work did not violate the Federal Constitution. 
We unanimously characterized the petitioner's constitu-
tional claim as "unprecedented." Id., at (slip op., at 
11). The contrast between Collins and this case could 
not be more stark. 
The lineage of the constitutional right asserted in this 
case dates back to the Magna Charta. See n. 2, supra. 
In an early Massachusetts case, Chief Justice Shaw 
described it as follows: 
"The right of individual citizens to be secure from 
an open and public accusation of crime, and from 
the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, 
before a probable cause is established by the pre-
sentment and indictment of a grand jury, in case of 
high offences, is justly regarded as one of the 
securities to the innocent against hasty, malicious, 
and oppressive public prosecutions, and as one of 
the ancient immunities and privileges of English 
liberty." Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. 329, 344 
(1857). 
Moreover, most of the Courts of Appeals have treated 
claims of prosecutions without probable cause as within 
"the ambit of compensability under the general rule of 
42 U. S. C. §1983 liability," see ante, at 5 (SOUTER, J., 
concurring in judgment). See, e.g., Golino v. New 
Haven, 950 F. 2d 864, 866-867 (CA2 1991) (and case 
cited therein), cert, denied, 509 U. S. (1992); Robin-
son v. Maruffi, 895 F. 2d 649, 654-657 (CA10 1990) 
(citing cases); Torres v. Superintendent of Police of 
Puerto Rico, 893 F. 2d 404, 408 (CA1 1990) (citing cases, 
and finding cause of action if "egregious"); Goodwin v. 
Metts, 885 F. 2d 157, 162 (CA4 1989) (citing cases), cert, 
denied, 494 U. S. 1081 (1990); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F. 2d 
331, 348-349 (CA3 1989) (citing cases); Strength v. 
Hubert, 854 F. 2d 421 (CA11 1988); Wheeler v. Cosden 
Oil & Chemical Co., 734 F. 2d 254 (CA5 1984). 
Given the abundance of precedent in the Courts of 
Appeals, the vintage of the liberty interest at stake, and 
the fact that the Fifth Amendment categorically forbids 
the Federal Government from initiating a felony prosecu-
tion without presentment to a grand jury, it is quite 
wrong to characterize petitioner's claim as an invitation 
to enter unchartered territory. On the contrary, the 
claim is manifestly of constitutional dimension. 
This conclusion should end our inquiry. Whether the 
Due Process Clause in any given case may provide a 
"duplication of protections," ante, at 2 (SOUTER, J., 
concurring in judgment) is irrelevant to whether a 
liberty interest is at stake.29 Even assuming the 
dubious proposition that, in this case, due process 
protection against a baseless prosecution may not 
provide "a substantial increment to protection otherwise 
available," ibid.,90 that is a consideration relevant only 
to damages, not to the existence of constitutional 
protection. Furthermore, that few of petitioner's injuries 
flowed solely from the filing of the charges against him 
does not make those injuries insubstantial, lb the 
contrary, I can think of few powers that the State 
possesses which, if arbitrarily imposed, can harm liberty 
as substantially as the filing of criminal charges. 
VIII 
While the supposed adequacy of an alternative federal 
remedy persuades JUSTICES GlNSBURG and SOUTER that 
petitioner's claim fails, the availability of an alternative 
state remedy convinces JUSTICE KENNEDY. I must 
therefore explain why I do not agree with his reliance 
on Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527 (1981). In 1975 I 
helped plant the seed that ultimately flowered into the 
Parratt doctrine. See Bonner v. Cougklin, 517 F. 2d 
1311, 1318-1319 (CA7 1975), modified en banc, 545 
F. 2d 565 (1976), cert, denied, 435 U. S. 932 (1978) 
(cited in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S., at 541-542). The 
plaintiff in Bonner, like the plaintiff in Parratt, claimed 
that the negligence of state agents had deprived him of 
a property interest "without due process of law." In 
both cases, the claim was rejected because a predepriva-
tion remedy was infeasible and the State's postdepriva-
tion remedy was considered adequate to prevent a 
constitutional violation. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U. S., at 
543-544; Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F. 2d, at 1319-1320. 
Both of those cases involved the type of ordinary 
common law tort that can be committed by anyone. 
Such torts are not deprivations "without due process" 
simply because the tortfeasor is a public official. 
The rationale of those cases is inapplicable to this case 
whether one views the claim at issue as substantive or 
"JUSTICE SOUTER relies in part upon 'pragmatic concerns about 
subjecting government actors to two (potentially inconsistent) stan-
dards for the same conduct." Ante, at 2. I see no basis for that 
concern in this case. Moreover, Congress properly weighs "prag-
matic concerns" when it decides whether to provide a remedy for a 
violation of federal law. Such concerns motivated the enactment of 
§1983—a statute that provides a remedy for constitutional violations. 
Thus, if such a violation is alleged—and I am satisfied that one is 
here—we have a duty to enforce the statute without examining 
pragmatic concerns. 
"It seems to me quite wrong to attribute to a subsequent arrest the 
reputations! and other harms caused by an unjustified accusation. In 
addition, although JUSTICE GlNSBURG is prepared to hold that a Fourth 
Amendment claim does not accrue until the baseless charges are 
dismissed, at least some of the Courts of Appeals have held that the 
arrest triggers the running of the statute of limitations. See, e. g.t Rote 
v. Bartle, 871 F. 2d 331, 351 (CA3 1989); McCune v. Grand Rapids, 842 
F. 2d 903, 906 (CA6 1988); Mack v. Varetas, 835 F. 2d 995, 1000 (CA2 
1987); Venegas v. Wagner, 704 F. 2d 1144,1146 (CA9 1983). And, given 
the disposition of this case, a majority of this Court might agree. In any 
event, uncertainties about such matters counsel against constitutional 
adjudication based upon "pragmatic concerns." 
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procedural.81 If one views the petitioner's claim as one 
of substantive due process, Parratt is categorically 
inapplicable. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U. S. 113, 125 
(1990). Conversely, if one views his claim as one of 
procedural due process, Parratt is also inapplicable, 
because its rationale does not apply to officially author-
ized deprivations of liberty or property. 
Thus, contrary to JUSTICE KENNEDY'S conclusion, ante, 
at 5, Parratt's "precedential force" does not dispose of 
this case. Petitioner was subjected to criminal charges 
by an affirmative, deliberate act of a state official.32 
The filing of criminal charges is effectuated through 
established state procedures under which government 
agents, such as respondent Oliver, are authorized to 
act.33 In addition, the State's authorized agent knows 
precisely when the deprivation of the liberty interest to 
be free from criminal prosecution will occur—the 
moment that the charges are filed.34 Therefore, as 
with arrest or imprisonment, the State is capable of 
providing a reasoned predeprivation determination, at 
least ex parte, prior to the commencement of criminal 
proceedings.35 See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U. S., at 
136-139. Failure to do so, or to do so in a meaningful 
way, see supra, at 8-11, is constitutionally unaccept-
able.36 Thus, notwithstanding the possible availability 
of a state tort action for malicious prosecution, §1983 
provides a federal remedy for the constitutional violation 
alleged by petitioner. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 
183 (1961) ("The federal remedy is supplementary to the 
state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought 
and refused before the federal one is invoked") (over-
ruled in part not relevant here, Monell v. New York City 
Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 664-689 (1978)). 
The remedy for a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause provided by §1983 is 
not limited, as JUSTICE KENNEDY posits, ante, at 5, to 
cases in which the injury has been caused by "a state 
law, policy, or procedure." One of the primary purposes 
of §1983 was to provide a remedy "against those who 
representing a State in some capacity were unable or 
unwilling to enforce a state law." Monroe v. Pape, 365 
U. S., at 175-176 (emphasis in original). Therefore, 
despite his suggestion to the contrary, ante, at 5, 
JUSTICE KENNEDY'S interpretation of Parratt is in direct 
conflict with both the language and the purposes of 
§1983. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S., at 172-187. 
"See 1 S. Nahmod, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Litigation: 
The Law of Section 1983, §3.15 pp. 211-212 (3d ed. 1991). 
"This case is thus distinguishable from Hudson v. Palmer, 468 
IT. S. 517 (1984), in which petitioner alleged that a prison guard 
intentionally destroyed his property. Id, at 533 (holding that the 
Due Process Clause is not violated by random and unauthorized 
intentional deprivations of property "until and unless it provides or 
refuses to. provide a suitable postdeprivation remedy*). 
M
 See n. 14, supra. 
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 The Parratt doctrine is also inapplicable here because it does not 
apply to cases in which the constitutional deprivation is complete 
when the tort occurs. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U. S., at 125 (citing 
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327, 338 (1986) (STEVENS, Jn concur-
ring in judgments)); see infra, at 22-23. 
"See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S., at 114 (holding that the 
Fourth Amendment, as applied to the States through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, "requires a judicial 
determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended 
restraint of liberty following arrest"). 
MSee, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422, 
43S-437 (1982). 
Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action against 
*[e]very person" who under color of state authority 
causes the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." 42 
U. S. C. §1983. The Parratt doctrine is reconcilable 
with §1983 only when its application is limited to 
situations in which no constitutional violation occurs. In 
the context of certain deprivations of property, due 
process is afforded—and therefore the Constitution is not 
violated—if an adequate postdeprivation state remedy is 
available in practice to provide either the property's 
prompt return or an equivalent compensation. See 
Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F. 2d, at 1320. In other 
contexts, however, including criminal cases and most 
cases involving a deprivation of liberty, the deprivation 
is complete, and the Due Process Clause has been 
violated, when the loss of liberty occurs.37 In those 
contexts, any postdeprivation state procedure is merely 
a remedy; because it does not provide the predeprivation 
process that is "due," it does not avoid the constitutional 
violation. In such cases, like this one, §1983 provides a 
federal remedy regardless of the adequacy of the state 
remedy. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S., at 183. 
DC 
The Court's judgment of affirmance is supported by 
five different opinions. Significantly, none of them 
endorses the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, and 
none of them commands a majority. Of greatest impor-
tance, in the aggregate those opinions do not reject my 
principal submission: the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment constrains the power of state 
governments to accuse a citizen of an infamous crime. 
I respectfully dissent. 
JOHN H. BISBEE, Macomb, 111. (BARRY NAKELL on the 
briefs) for petitioner; JAMES G. SOTOS, Itasca, 111. 
(MICHAEL W. CONDON, CHARLES E. HERVAS, 
MICHAEL D. BERSANI, and HERVAS, SOTOS & 
CONDON PC, on the briefs) for respondents. 
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